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MS. COLEMAN:  Good morning, everyone.  We 
are going to get started on the second session. 
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discussing merger retrospectives.  I’m Mary Coleman 
with Compass Lexecon and I’ll be moderating the panel. 
I’m pleased to welcome several distinguished 
speakers to our panel.  First, on my right we have 
Bruce Kobayashi, who is the current Director of the 
Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission.  
Next to him is Lee Van Voorhis, who is currently a 
Partner at Jenner & Block.  Next to Lee is Leslie 
Overton, who’s a Partner at Alston & Bird and who was 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust 
Division of DOJ from 2011 to 2015.  Finally, on the 
end we have Ben Wagner, who is a Vice President at 
Compass Lexecon. 
In this panel, like the last panel, we have 
a few different topics about merger retrospectives 
that we are going to discuss.  We are going to do it 
in a Q&A format, hopefully get some discussion going, 
and we will try to open up to questions for the 
panelists from the audience either at the end of topic 






Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
When you do ask questions, I’ll try to 
remember to remind people, if you can state your name 
and where you are from, and if you can come to one of 
the mics that are on the side, they are doing a 
transcript and this will help them to hear the 
questions being asked and know who asked it. 
Before we get started, I would also like to 
give Bruce a chance to give his needed disclaimer. 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  I’ve been at the Federal 
Trade Commission for over three months, so I’ve got 
all the experience and knowledge that I’ll ever get 
there. 
The views expressed today are those that are 
mine and not necessarily those of the Federal Trade 
Commission or any of its individual Commissioners.  
MS. COLEMAN:  To get started, we are first 
going to talk a little bit about what are merger 
retrospectives and the history.  Ben, if you can kick 
us off and say briefly what is a merger retrospective 
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MR. WAGNER:  Sure.  I guess I’ll start from 
a noneconomic point of view which is also an economic 
point of view.  It’s really a backwards-looking 
analysis after a deal — a full merger or a partial 
merger, a joint venture — if it’s horizontal, any sort 
of change in concentration, and just asking the 
question, what was the result of this event?  Was it 
good for consumers; was it bad for consumers; did it 
have a competitively neutral impact?  And then, armed 
with that information, which I will be talking a lot 
about today, what does that mean; what can we do with 
that information to inform general merger policy, a 
deal that we’re evaluating currently; what lessons can 
be learned, if any, from the results that we find; and 
what can we do going forward? 
From a more economic perspective, the way I 
look at merger retrospective would be sort of like any 
other event study.  If you’re trying to figure out 
what the impact of a minimum wage increase is on labor 
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prices because of an alleged cartel or what happened 
when a competitor entered a market, those are all 
event studies, and a merger retrospective is in the 
same vein.  The context and the details are different, 
but think about them similarly. 
The way that is is:  What happened to some 
outcome that you’re interested in that you think is 
reflective of consumer welfare — price, quality, 
quantity — so what happened?  And then the hard part:  
What would have happened had this event not happened?  
With the two of those components together, hopefully 
you can try to attribute some of what you find to a 
direct impact of the merger and maybe say that there’s 
causality there and not that there was something else 
going on. 
MS. COLEMAN:  Thanks, Ben. 
Bruce, the FTC has done a fair number of 
merger retrospectives over the years.  Could you give 
us a little history of the program at the FTC? 
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Probably actually one of the big events that 
caused the FTC to start doing this, and we’ve been 
doing them — I say “we” — the people preceding me have 
done lots of retrospectives. 
One of the events that caused the FTC as an 
agency to think a lot about merger retrospectives was 
losing six, and then by the time the retrospective 
program was in full bloom eight, hospital cases in a 
row.   
At the time those cases used the Elzinga-
Hogarty Test to do market definition.  If you 
remember, Elzinga-Hogarty measured the flow of 
patients in and out of regions and you had some 
arbitrary thresholds (15, 25 percent) and you 
increased the geographic market until those thresholds 
were met.  What was happening was we would see mergers 
of the only two hospitals in a rural area, but that 
rural area was not a market under the Elzinga-Hogarty 
Test because there was a significant number of 
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miles away. 
Theoretically people noted that that was 
problematic because the people who were going 125 
miles usually were going for something that maybe 
wasn’t offered or wasn’t offered at the same quality 
as the small hospitals.  In fact, they were 
inframarginal rather than marginal consumers. 
As a result of these, the geographic markets 
were huge and we lost, and the DOJ also lost, seven 
consecutive hospital mergers. 
In 2002 my coauthor and colleague at Scalia 
Law School Tim Muris, and a former Chairman of the 
FTC, said:  We need to sort of look back to see what 
happened in all these cases that hopefully we didn’t 
screw up.  We wanted to challenge them, but maybe the 
people making the calls, the judges, did. 
They subpoenaed data from hospitals and 
insurance companies and they actually estimated, as 
Ben set out, the price effects of four hospital 
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and Seth Sacher on the competitive effects of 
nonprofits [The Competitive Effects of Not‐for‐Profit 
Hospital Mergers: A Case Study], and, out of Tim 
Muris’s wish to look at these mergers, they also 
published three Bureau of Economics working papers on 
hospital mergers.  They found that these mergers which 
we thought were problematic but the courts did not 
resulted post-merger, after the mergers were 
consummated, in large price increases. 
It also suggested that we had a particular 
problem in the use of our tools to define geographic 
markets.  It caused us to adopt the tools that we use 
today, which are the willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
bargaining models.   
That evidence was then used going forward, 
and it has resulted in immediately the successful 
challenge to the consummated merger in Evanston 
Northwestern Healthcare/Highland Park and a rather 
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We have continued and under the current 
leadership of the FTC plan to continue being self-
evaluating, and critically self-evaluating.  So we 
think that merger retrospectives are an important 
thing to spend our resources on and learn what is 
going on with what we do and the tools we use going 
forward. 
We currently, I think, in the Bureau have 
six merger retrospectives ongoing in various stages of 
getting published, being written, requesting data.  So 
we continue to have a robust program at the FTC. 
MS. COLEMAN:  Thanks, Bruce.  
Leslie and Lee, FTC is clearly one source of 
merger retrospectives.  Maybe you could talk a little 
bit about other sources, either private sector or from 
the DOJ side, Leslie, from your experience. 
MS. OVERTON:  I’ll say the FTC has been more 
active in merger retrospectives than the DOJ.  But 
other agencies around the world have done 
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retrospectives.  They are an important source.  
Private parties commission retrospectives in certain 
litigation or agency advocacy contexts.  So I think 
really anyone who can get access to the necessary data 
for the methodology they want to use and can put in 
the demanding work that these take could do it. 
MR. VAN VOORHIS:  I don’t have much to add 
on that other than I think that Leslie’s last point 
suggests why government agencies around the world are 
best positioned oftentimes to do these.  It’s because 
of access to the data necessary to do a retrospective 
in the first place that is hard to come by for any 
entity outside the government, whether a researcher or 
a company. 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  I have to say that it’s also 
hard for us too.  If you think about all of our 
hospital retrospectives, we buy the data like anybody 
else. 
Dan Hosken, who has done and still does a 
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Matthew Weinberg and Orley Ashenfelter.  They bought 
the data.  I think Orley bought the data because he 
was concerned that if the FTC bought the data that he 
would have a harder time if there was some fight with 
Dan — which there wasn’t — getting it out. 
One of the shocking things to me is that 
there wasn’t any special advantage from being at the 
FTC.  We go out and we buy the patient and insure data 
just like anybody else.  I think from our perspective 
we want to do that and it’s just really important in 
terms of self-evaluation. 
MS. COLEMAN:  Now we’ve talked a little bit 
about what a merger retrospective is and something of 
its history and the sources of merger retrospectives. 
Now we want to move on to the topic of what 
makes a good or high-quality merger retrospective.  To 
start us off, Ben, can you just talk a little bit 
about the basic methodology — or methodologies because 
there’s more than one — that have been employed in 
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MR. WAGNER:  Sure. 
Just on that last point briefly, I think 
Bruce enunciated why a lot of the retrospectives like 
you were talking about were done by the FTC have been 
these hospital ones, because that’s where you can 
actually buy in the public domain the detailed sources 
of data you need to get a somewhat robust result. 
On the advocacy side, I have done a lot of 
these.  Obviously, they are never going to see the 
light of day in published journals or anything like 
that.  But you can learn a lot when you have the types 
of data that you need — sometimes you want detailed 
cost data, detailed price data, at the product level — 
but then you try to go out and look for something that 
you can use in the public domain to study and to 
publish.  It’s very difficult to get the kinds of data 
you need to conduct these.  But, fortunately, working 
with clients you get access to some of these sources 
of data and you can do the kinds of detailed things 
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questions. 
The basic methodology that is pretty 
standard now in these merger retrospectives is the 
difference-in-difference (DID) methodology.  Basically 
what you’re doing is you’re finding — like I was 
talking about before, what you’re really interested in 
is what happened after the merger and what would have 
happened had the merger not occurred.  
The first part if you have the data is 
somewhat easy.  You can say, “Okay, here’s this event.  
Here are some markets or products that were affected — 
we’ll call those a treatment group.”  If it’s a 
horizontal merger, that’s where the parties have 
overlap.  Also, obviously, when you’re doing these 
things there’s some question about what degree of 
overlap are we going to study, and there is how big of 
an overlap does it need to be to be in the treatment 
group and lots of things.  Every single part of these 
retrospectives has assumptions you have to make.  We 
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Basically, you take a group of markets or 
products, a treatment group, that is affected by the 
merger and you have an outcome variable like I was 
talking about earlier, like prices or quantity or 
quality, and you look at the change in let’s say price 
before and after the merger in the markets that were 
affected — let’s say that prices go up $10.  Then you 
have a group of markets that you think simulate what 
would have happened absent the merger, that were 
unaffected by the merger — let’s say prices in that 
market went up $5.  So the inference there is that the 
net effect of the merger was not to increase prices by 
$10 but to increase prices by $5. 
One way you can do that is by having a 
control group, a group of markets unaffected by the 
merger.  This can work pretty well when you have a 
retail merger or a hospital merger and you have 
geographic markets that are affected and geographic 
markets that are not affected.  Hopefully you can say 
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example, would be similar in both those markets. 
But sometimes that’s not so easy.  If you 
have a retail merger that affects products all across 
the United States — let’s say Coke and Pepsi were 
merging and they’re in every single grocery store — so 
what are you going to use as a control group?  Those 
kinds of things can be difficult in those cases. 
One thing you can try to do is estimate a 
regression where you include a factor if you don’t 
really have a control group where you try to control 
what would have happened absent the merger by 
controlling for things like cost and demand, and you 
put those in the model and you can control for them, 
and you can hopefully get an estimate of what happened 
and you can say that it’s a causal estimate.  But the 
kinds of data that are required to estimate a reliable 
model are very hard to come by, so the standard 
methodology that is typically used is this difference-
in-difference methodology. 
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Bruce, employing either the difference-in-
difference, which has the been more standard, but as 
Ben said, if you wanted to estimate more of a model of 
prices or other effects over time, what are some of 
the issues that come up when you’re trying to do that 
and make sure that you’re doing a high-quality, robust 
study? 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  I think all of the 
retrospectives that the Bureau of Economics (BE) has 
put out as reports are difference-in-difference.  I 
won’t say diff-in-diff or DID.  But there are 
problems. 
If you use these things called fixed effects 
to control for things that are common but that are 
idiosyncratic differences that stay constant over time 
in what we call in econometrics identification, that’s 
generally the identification strategy that allows us 
to say “A causes B” rather than “A is just somehow 
related or correlated to B.”   
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this great website that has all these correlations, 
like number of Nick Cage movies and teenage suicide 
and the correlation is 0.97.  This sort of gets at 
that point. 
What we like to do at the Bureau — and we 
sort of have a methodology — is that we like to at 
least have some plausible causal claim that what we 
are measuring is the effect of the merger and not some 
other effect.  
One of the things we do is we ask two basic 
questions when we’re thinking about a retrospective.  
One is: Do we have the data?  The corollary to that 
is: Do we know what our left-hand side variable is; 
what are we trying to measure?  It’s not always just 
the price.  Sometimes it’s the quality-adjusted price.  
Sometimes it’s some larger metric of competition. 
The second thing — and this is another big 
thing as Ben pointed out — is: What’s the control 
group?  We tend to look, at he said, at geographic 
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markets but not others, and you could use the 
nonaffected geographic markets as a control group. 
If we don’t have those, generally the Bureau 
says we’re not going to do those, because in the end 
if we find what we would call a first difference, 
before the merger and after merger, and price goes up, 
we have no idea whether or not that is due to the 
merger or due to some other spurious effect. 
The other way you can do it — and I think in 
the CLE readings, or at least in the bibliography, 
there are a few pieces by Dan Hosken with Matthew 
Weinberg and Orley Ashenfelter, and one with Mike Vita 
— you could do what I would call the old-style 
structural models or reduced form models where you try 
to stuff every important variable in a regression to 
do the prediction and you have a dummy variable to 
note whether or not it is after the merger, and then 
you look at that dummy variable to see the price 
effect. 
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called omitted variable bias.  If you leave out 
something that is correlated with the stuff you put 
in, then all of the variables that you put in, 
including that dummy variable which you are using to 
try to infer a causal effect of the merger, is 
carrying that thing you left out.   
Basically it’s the same problem.  Why do we 
leave out stuff we think is important for correlating 
with the stuff we put in?  Because (1) we don’t know 
of (2) we can’t measure it. 
So largely over the past decade there has 
been this — it’s an unfortunate term — credibility 
revolution in economics, where we’ve gone to causal 
designs like difference-in-difference because that old 
way of trying to get the model right is just too hard 
and we never really achieve it.  At the Bureau almost 
all the things we do are difference-in-difference and 
then we require a control group. 
MR. WAGNER:  Just another thought about the 
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affects lots of markets and sometimes you can have a 
merger that affects a single market.  A lot of the 
work that goes into this is trying to figure out if 
the control group is appropriate.  If you have a 
single market, you can do a lot of work trying to 
figure out what’s the best approximation of this 
place, of this city or metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) or whatever it is.  If you have forty markets 
that are affected, you might have a harder time 
finding a good control group and developing forty 
control groups might be tough, but you also have more 
events to study, so you might think that on average 
the effect in those forty markets is telling you 
something useful. 
When I work on those things, they usually 
fall into one of those two buckets: there’s one market 
that’s affected and you can spend a lot of time really 
trying to get a great control group; or there are lots 
of markets affected and you can spend a little bit 
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distribution around the effects in all those different 
places. 
MS. COLEMAN:  One of the issues that came up 
in the first topic we were discussing and we’re 
talking about here is the limits of rigorous access to 
data.  As Bruce pointed out, a lot of what they do now 
is work on studies where they can buy data or have it 
from public sources.  Ben had noted that in some cases 
on the private side you will do studies for a 
particular deal because there’s a past transaction you 
think might be informative of the current deal.   
But, as Bruce had noted, in the beginning of 
the hospital retrospectives there was subpoena power 
used to gather information.  Maybe Lee and Leslie 
could talk about whether that could be an appropriate 
use in other situations and when that might be the 
case and when it might not. 
MR. VAN VOORHIS:  Yes.  I think there are at 
least two, but two fairly significant concerns of 
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that will be useful in these — I think admittedly 
useful — in the merger retrospectives. 
The first one is just strictly 
confidentiality and whether you can have sufficient 
confidentiality protections to give comfort to parties 
that their information will not be put out there or 
used in some way that is detrimental to the business. 
The second one I think is equally as 
significant — maybe more so — and that is I think 
there might be a great fear of what the use of the 
information will be by government enforcers when they 
get it.  Justified or not, I think that this fear is 
fairly prevalent.  Bruce even said in his remarks the 
FTC’s impetus to do a hospital merger study was not 
intellectual curiosity but rather losing cases.  Of 
course that’s purely human nature that you want to go 
back, and you are more often going to look at your 
losses than your wins.  But I think that is a 
legitimate justification for the fear. 
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later, but when a company turns over information to a 
government enforcer, it’s not just what they might 
find out about a merger you had done but what else 
they might find out about your industry to prompt some 
new investigation.  
Maybe there are safeguards that can be put 
around this, guardrails that can be put around this — 
we’ll talk about that later too — but I think there 
are some rather big concerns for private companies in 
providing the useful data. 
While we’re talking about what information 
could be used, without trying to preempt your role, I 
have a couple of questions for the economists 
actually.   
In merger review itself, of course the 
parties have produced documents and other information.  
So one of my questions is: is that used in these types 
of information?  Putting aside the very issues I’ve 
just raised about getting it for the future, there are 
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whatever else — and I wonder if those are brought to 
bear. 
And then my second question: Another thing 
that’s look at of course in merger review 
prospectively is the role of innovation and market 
dynamics and change.  I wonder to what extent that is 
brought to bear in the merger retrospectives that have 
been done thus far.  There are some cases that leap to 
my mind as being particularly interesting that might 
be looked at: things like Blockbuster/Hollywood 
Entertainment, which got a lot of scrutiny, and 
eventually that industry went away a very short time 
afterwards; or Sirius/XM Radio, looking at the flip 
side, got approved and now was that the right call; or 
Whole Foods/Wild Oats, where natural and organic 
supermarkets were maybe a thing but now everywhere has 
that. 
Back to the question, to what extent are 
documents and documentary evidence brought to bear and 
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numerical data, and to what extent is innovation taken 
into consideration? 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  I’ve been three months.  
[Laughter]  There’s a lot there. 
Whole Foods is different.  There’s also when 
we do merger investigations, which the FTC has done — 
I mean Whole Foods was an instance where there was a 
natural experiment.  You’re using the same kind of 
difference-in-difference methodology to predict the 
effects of mergers based on the reverse thing, where 
what happened to grocery premium organic supermarket 
prices, the basket, when you had entry into the market 
and you think that the merger is just the reverse of 
that.  I didn’t work in Whole Foods. 
It did work in Staples/Office Depot, which 
is another one where the FTC prospectively used 
natural experiments to try to look at — you know, we 
have a Fredericksburg, Virginia, and what happens when 
Office Depot comes in or what happens when the BestBuy 
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and just actually get some idea of direct effects 
using the same kind of difference-in-difference 
methodology. 
There is a great paper I recommend everybody 
read by Orley Ashenfelter, Jonathan Baker, and David 
Ashmore on the econometric evidence in FTC v. Staples.  
That was the 1996 one, not the 2015 one.  If you think 
about innovation, I think the FTC challenged the 
second go-around of Staples/Office Depot.  They did 
the same type of natural experiment stuff on the 
consumer side, said “Amazon, things change,” so they 
did take it into account, and then they said, “But we 
have a different problem, which is the business side.” 
We do try to take those things into account 
when we’re looking at mergers when we have natural 
experiments — 
MR. VAN VOORHIS:  Retrospectively. 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  Retrospectively? 
If you have innovation, it’s hard.  Usually 
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falls into what’s your measure, because dynamic 
markets are not impossible — we do think about them, 
we think about them seriously — but they are harder to 
get a grasp on even theoretically, but empirically 
they are even harder. 
We do like to look at the tools that we are 
using and that I think we’re going to talk about.  The 
merger shops both at DOJ and the FTC use a lot of 
tools.  It’s no longer the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).  It’s these first-order conditions: Upward 
Price Pressure (UPP), Gross Upward Price Pressure 
Index (GUPPI), Compensating Marginal-Cost Reductions 
(CMCR).   
There are a lot of retrospectives — and I 
think this is the part where the agencies have the 
advantage because in our merger reviews we use these 
tools, the economists calculate it — and what you can 
do in some of them, especially merger simulation, is 
you get a price prediction.  So we could compare what 
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compare that retrospectively to actually what happens. 
That is really the same thing as what Tim 
Muris wanted to do in the 1990s when we were losing.  
But we’re not necessarily losing; it’s the things we 
let go.   
It’s an important point to note that we 
can’t do retrospectives on the things we block.  We 
can only do retrospectives on the things that we 
either decide not to challenge or we decide to 
challenge but a court decides that we’re not going to 
be able to enjoin the merger. 
There is a big thing called selection 
effects, which we only see one side of the ledger 
there.  All of the transactions that we do block, 
there are correct outcomes where we block 
anticompetitive mergers, and I’ll guarantee you there 
are going to be errors where we erroneously blocked 
efficient mergers.  So that side we can’t even see. 
I’ve probably said this.  I’m half joking.  
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randomly select mergers on the margin and randomly let 
them go just so you can get both sides.  We do that in 
every other setting.  They usually tell me to take 
Mike’s stuff out of my office or throw it out on the 
street when I say this.  But random selection is 
really a big part of having a causal design.  I mean 
if you think of how we test drugs, we give half of the 
people the potentially life-saving drugs and then we 
give of very sick people a placebo.  That is so we 
learn stuff.  It’s not that we want to harm the people 
either taking the treatment or the placebo. 
It’s very hard in this setting to even think 
about doing that.  Even if you’re doing natural 
experiments, like Office Depot, the joke is that entry 
is not exogenous; entry occurs because of market 
conditions.  So Staples or Office Depot comes into a 
market because they’re not throwing darts at a map; 
they’re basically looking at where they want to come 
in.  So what’s the natural experiment there?  I guess 
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with cans of gasoline and randomly burn down some 
office supply stores, but that probably isn’t going to 
pass any review board either. 
And if you look at Whole Foods, that 
certainly was brought up. 
QUESTION [Cecile Kohrs]:  Burning down Whole 
Foods? 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  No, no, no.  This always 
goes bad for me when I do this. 
What comes up is the fact that the 
experiments aren’t random selection.  You do see that, 
I think, in Judge Hogan’s decision in Staples/Office 
Depot.  There were a lot fewer events in Whole 
Foods/Wild Oats than there were in Staples/Office 
Depot, so you run into problems with statistical 
precision and power and stuff. 
I think one of the things to learn is we 
have a lot of tools.  We don’t just blindly use those 
tools.  And certainly we have a whole Bureau of 
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things. 
MR. VAN VOORHIS:  I didn’t mean them.  I 
certainly know looking prospectively.  I just think of 
where they could be brought to bear retrospectively as 
well. 
MR. WAGNER:  I agree with all that.  Just to 
piggyback on that — I think Bruce mentioned this, but 
maybe it deserves more note — if you have a direct 
estimate or entry or through a merger retrospective, 
it can be a substitute for market definition.   
In the innovation point, let’s say there are 
two competitors in your defined antitrust market, 
Hollywood and Blockbuster, and you think These are the 
only two guys in the market — or I guess maybe in this 
example there would have to be three because we had to 
be studying a merger — but you do that study and you 
find that, “Okay,  there was no impact on price.”   
So what does that mean?  One inference is 
that the market was already competitive enough.  I 
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with all these other people who are providing video, 
but I can be reasonably certain there was no impact 
from this increase in concentration.  So that must 
mean that there are other competitors who were making 
the market competitive enough such that I see no 
effect. 
In that case, to your point, Lee, obviously 
if the event happened many years ago it’s not going to 
be that relevant still, but maybe there are some entry 
events that happened recently, or maybe you have a 
merger from a few years ago and you have some entry 
recently and you have two data points, and you can 
look at those and you can say, “Oh, well when this 
competitor entered there wasn’t much of an effect and 
when I looked at this merger retrospective there 
didn’t seem to be much there either, so it seems like 
the market was — I don’t know exactly who the other 
players are, but it seems like the market was already 
competitive enough,” and so those direct effects can 
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get good and reliable estimates. 
To Bruce’s other point, even if you could 
randomly let through a few mergers, the test in these 
things is not like testing drugs obviously.  You have 
a lot of these assumptions you have to make and you 
have to be able to figure out reliably if the effect 
is a 10 percent increase on price, I bet there are 
some assumptions you could change or make and now that 
10 percent is 4 or 5 percent, and maybe that is a 
whole different set of inferences that you have to 
make. 
MS. COLEMAN:  I think this may lead us 
naturally into our next discussion, which is: what is 
the role of merger retrospectives; why does it make 
sense to conduct these?  We’ve thought about, and 
we’ve already mentioned, different ways that they can 
be useful. 
Leslie, can you talk about can they be used 
to test how well the agencies or the courts are doing 
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MS. OVERTON:  I think they can be.  They do 
have a role in informing how well the agencies are 
doing.  I think it’s important though that they be 
used as a tool but not given too much weight in terms 
of saying how the agencies are doing.  You could have 
an agency that does a very good job making a merger 
enforcement decision based on what it has available to 
it and then it turns out that there is a price effect 
for some other reason.  I think it’s important to not 
read too much into it. 
I also think we don’t get merger 
retrospectives evenly across the board.  There are 
certain industries that they tend to be concentrated 
in for reasons of data, congressional interest, other 
reasons.  So I think it could present a misleading 
picture if we look and say, “Oh, the merger 
retrospective told us this; that sells us everything 
about what the agency is doing.” 
But I do think that there are definitely 






Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
data for the methodology that they are trying to use 
and that they are able to take into account all of 
these different issues that we are talking about.  
These are hard to do, these are labor-intensive 
studies, and I think that they can go off the rails.  
So if you’ve got an agency that is willing to make 
that commitment and is willing to be self-critical, I 
think that’s valuable. 
I do think it is also important to not read 
too much into them because you don’t want to chill and 
agency’s interest in doing retrospectives and being 
self-critical.  You don’t want the agency to only 
choose retrospectives that are going to reflect well 
on the agency.  
MS. COLEMAN:  Any responses to Leslie’s 
comments from the panel? 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  John Kwoka has a book 
[Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A 
Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Policy], which I think 
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Vita has written a defense of the agency. 
I think one of the things that Leslie 
pointed out which really deserves highlighting is that 
if you look at his set of forty-nine or fifty 
retrospectives, some of them are really old and a lot 
of them are hospitals, airlines, retail, petroleum.  
That’s where these things are.   
Why are we interested in them?  We’re 
interested in some sense because there are some 
marginal mergers, but mostly those retrospectives got 
done because there is data.  Why are retail mergers 
done?  Because there’s something called Nielsen data, 
which is scanner data and you get quantities and then 
you get some noisy measure of price.  For hospital 
mergers we can buy the patient and health insurer 
data.  For oil there’s lots of good data. 
There’s an old joke about the economist 
under the streetlamp.  How many of you have heard the 
economist under the streetlamp joke?   
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said to the economist, “What are you doing?”   
He said, “I’m looking for my keys.  I 
dropped them over there in the middle of the dark 
street.”   
He said, “Why are you looking under the 
streetlamp if they’re over there?” 
He said, “That’s where the light is.”  
[Laughter] 
There are lots of economist jokes.  They’re 
mostly not jokes, they’re just mean.  [Laughter]  
There’s “assume a can opener” and all of that stuff. 
But in a sense what we have to remember is 
what John did in his book.  It’s actually an 
interesting book.  It’s a meta-analysis, taking a 
study of the studies.  He sort of said, “Okay, here’s 
the body of retrospectives, the body of studies, and 
let’s do a study of studies and see what happens on 
average.” 
On average, the median price increase — 
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mergers that led to an increase in price of 40−50 
percent — but the median price increase is 0.8 
percent.  Something like 30 percent are either 
negative 5-to-0 or 0-to-plus-5 percent.   
Part of what you don’t want to do is say, 
“Well, the agencies have been permissive because in 
half of the mergers that we look at versus 
retrospectives the prices go up, and some of them go 
up a lot.” 
If you’re really doing optimal antitrust 
enforcement and you go to the right margin — remember 
we only see the mergers that we let go or a court lets 
go; we don’t see all the mergers that we block — you 
probably want to have something where the average or 
the median effect is pretty close to zero, and you 
think that there’s going to probably be around a 50 
percent error rate on the side of the mergers that you 
see.  If you go and you start blocking more mergers, 
you are going to probably be causing the other type of 
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But we don’t know because we don’t really see that. 
So it’s a difficult task to over-infer about 
what the agencies are doing and whether they are doing 
something that’s too lax or too strong because of just 
the strong selection effects and the limitations that 
data put on us to look at mergers as a whole. 
Plus they’re expensive.  Greg Werden has a 
nice piece saying, “Look, you can’t just do these 
things in a vacuum.  They’re actually quite hard to do 
and they require a lot of institutional knowledge.  If 
you don’t have that institutional knowledge, you’re 
going to do a bad study.” 
MS. OVERTON:  Let me just say too that the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has done a lot of work around 
merger retrospectives and giving countries tools for 
how to think about merger retrospectives — not telling 
them one methodology, because as we’ve talked about 
these are very, very difficult to do and it’s going to 
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of other factors.  But there has been a good amount of 
work that OECD has done to help countries understand 
the considerations for using merger retrospectives for 
self-assessment. 
MR. WAGNER:  One of the points of that 
Werden piece is that it’s hard to do these things.  
One of that criticisms of that Kwoka book is that he 
didn’t present any distributions around what those 
effects are.  To get right what the but-for world is 
and to get right what the effect is, he sort of treats 
these things as precise estimates, but there’s going 
to be a range of assumptions you can make, it’s not an 
exact science, and some of those distributions might 
be large. 
When you think about doing testing of merger 
simulation versus what happened from a merger, you 
can’t take for granted that what happened after the 
merger is exactly correct.   
The way I see it is you can do a bunch of 
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things and you get a range of outcomes and hopefully 
that range of outcomes points in a certain direction, 
and combined with other evidence, documentary evidence 
and things like that, can point you to the truth.  But 
it’s hard to put precise estimates on these things, 
and some of the inferences that you’re trying to make 
when using precise estimates — “Well, the simulation 
predicted 5 percent, but the actual fact was 8 or 9 
percent” — to one person that might be bad; to another 
person, “Well, that’s pretty good.” 
But these things are difficult and there’s a 
lot of effort, like we’ve talked about, that goes into 
it.  There are reasonable assumptions that you have to 
make.  That’s just something to be cognizant of. 
MS. COLEMAN:  Bruce had brought up earlier 
that the hospital retrospective study in Evanston was 
used to successfully block a consummated merger, and 
there certainly have been other challenges to 
consummated mergers in recent years.  When can merger 
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challenging consummated mergers and what issues arise 
in conducting such analyses? 
MR. VAN VOORHIS:  I think there is a 
difference between “when can they,” which might be 
fairly frequently, and “when should they,” which is 
arguably never.  [Laughter] 
I think that you have to see there is at 
least the possibility of a different viewpoint on the 
hospital study and what happened as a result of it, 
whether that’s a positive or a negative thing. 
But, more neutrally, I think you do have to 
evaluate the policy considerations, of whether it’s a 
good policy to take merger retrospectives and 
challenge specific consummated transactions. 
This goes back to what I was talking about 
earlier in terms of getting the data.  We all 
acknowledge getting the data and information necessary 
to do a good retrospective is a real challenge on top 
of all the other challenges that we’ve talked about in 
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If the goal is to encourage private entities 
to allow their data and information to be used in a 
merger retrospective, then I would argue that there’s 
got to be some protection given as to how that data 
will be used.  This is, I think, a very specific one 
that goes to the fear I mentioned before about turning 
over the data only to find it thrown back in your face 
that you have done something — maybe it’s a 
consummated merger, or maybe something else, some 
other behavior — and you have an enforcement action 
against you when all you were doing was trying to help 
merger retrospective studies to deliver better tools 
and better analysis in the future, which I think we 
all agree is probably the point of doing these merger 
retrospectives, putting John Kwoka’s book to one side.  
That’s my point on those. 
MS. COLEMAN:  Other thoughts about using 
retrospectives for consummated mergers? 
[No response] 
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about using merger retrospectives to assess a proposed 
merger in the same industry where there was some 
previous merger.  Can we talk a little bit about when 
that might be appropriate, again what issues, and I’d 
like to hear everyone’s experience at and before the 
agencies of trying to put forward such retrospective 
studies or when the agencies do them themselves? 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  The FTC sees them.  
Sometimes they occur as part of the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
filing, which I think Ben mentioned. 
Chris Garmon has just published a paper in 
RAND.  Chris did a lot of this work when he was at the 
Bureau of Economists at the FTC, where he said, “Let’s 
evaluate our tools that we use in hospital mergers.”  
I think he looked at seven consummated hospital 
mergers doing our traditional hospital retrospectives.  
One is the pay model and using those to get price 
predictions.  He looked at HHIs, whether they are 
predictive; the first-order Upper Pricing Pressure 
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looked at how all these tools would have informed, at 
least on the economist side, the merger evaluation and 
then compared it to what the retrospective did. 
I think that is really an important thing to 
do because, like all tools — whether it’s in the old 
days when I was last at the agency when we used 
structural tools to do screens or you use these newer 
tools — it’s really important to see how well they 
work. 
The parties can and certainly do use them to 
say, “Your tools aren’t very good” or “they over-
predict price increases here.”  So we see them. 
A lot of the problems that I think we see 
with these retrospectives is, as Ben said, they are 
just estimates.  Our tools, our predictions, the 
estimates of the price increase are estimates, they’re 
not actual causal effects of the merger.  So they have 
standard errors.  A lot of times people are arguing 
they’re zero, and they are actually not zero; the 
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significant.  That’s a problem of not having enough 
data and not having enough precision in your 
estimates. 
When you want your parties to come in, the 
thing you’ll hear from the Bureau of Economics is 
“What’s the power of your test?”  Ask your consulting 
economist what that means.  It means is your test 
likely to detect a small-but-significant price 
increase if it was there?  So significance is not just 
the only thing that we care about.  We also care 
about, “Well, okay, what if there was a price 
increase; would your test detect it?” and that’s the 
issue of power. 
MR. WAGNER:  What we’re trying to do is 
figure out what is going to happen before the merger 
and what’s going to happen after the merger.  You’re 
trying to make a prediction.   
One tool is saying, “Well, if there’s a 
merger in the same industry — maybe even one of the 
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that’s obviously a data point possibly among other 
data points that can help you infer what is going to 
happen after this deal.” 
I think Mary’s question is when is it useful 
to do a merger retrospective to inform what’s going to 
happen in this deal?  Setting aside let’s say that you 
could get the estimate exactly correct from the prior 
retrospective, you would want to know are the parties 
in the merger you are studying selling a similar 
product to what they’re selling in the deal that you 
have.  Is it the same product market or is it 
differentiated enough such that maybe this doesn’t 
bear on the current deal? 
What was the change in the level of 
concentration in a horizontal deal, the deal that 
you’re studying, versus the deal that has been 
proposed?  Maybe you might think, This merger I’m 
studying will only change concentration by X, and this 
deal is bigger, so we can learn something; but if it 
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would be better.  Or When did that prior event happen?  
Have there been changes in the industry since that 
event that you’re studying such that it doesn’t make 
it very relevant anymore? 
These are some of the things that you would 
want to consider if you wanted to say, “This prior 
merger that I’m studying in this industry, possibly 
even with one of the same firms that’s involved in the 
deal now, has a bearing on what I think is going to 
happen as a result of this merger.” 
I don’t know how I’d weight those things, 
but those are the things that I’d think about when 
trying to say that this has a bearing on the current 
deal or not. 
MS. COLEMAN:  Lee and Leslie, you are in a 
deal like this and your consulting economists are 
saying, “We think it worthwhile to look at this.”  
What is your reaction?  How do you work with the 
client to figure out does it make sense to invest in 
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MS. OVERTON:  I think I’d take into account 
the types of factors that Ben was talking about.   
For example, how similar is the product?  
Just to give an example of a real-life use of a merger 
retrospective in a new merger, in the GE/Electrolux 
matter there was a merger retrospective related to 
Whirlpool/Maytag.  Whirlpool/Maytag involved washing 
machines.  In the new deal the government said that 
the problem was in cooking appliances.  But one could 
argue that they are all appliances.  I think the 
government wasn’t persuaded.  We don’t know whether a 
court would have been persuaded or not because the 
parties abandoned while the case was at trial. 
But I would want to know.  These are such 
big undertakings and the government is so likely to be 
skeptical of it, I would want to have a really good 
case, really good data, really strong similarity, 
before I invested the resources. 
MR. VAN VOORHIS:  I agree with everything 
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narrow it to a fairly small set of cases where it 
makes sense.  
I think it also has to be a deal with large 
enough parties and a large enough deal that the 
investment of the resources makes sense, even if 
everything else factored in its favor. 
So I think the practical considerations 
severely limit the willingness of the parties to 
undertake this in a unique transaction. 
MR. WAGNER:  I guess there is one other 
thing to mention.  There was a discussion of 
efficiencies earlier today.  If you do have an event 
where the acquiring party is now making another 
acquisition, you might use one of the prior deals to 
test one of your efficiencies arguments.  That’s 
another place where it might be useful. 
I would say obviously if one of the parties 
in the deal was involved in the prior deal, as opposed 
to two other competitors, that is probably a good 
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MS. OVERTON:  I agree with that, Ben.  I 
think parties can improve their credibility on the 
issue of efficiencies if — we’re not talking about a 
full-blown retrospective study, but if they can show 
that they actually did achieve efficiencies in past 
deals, I think that could be helpful for their 
credibility. 
MS. COLEMAN:  One last topic, and we’ll try 
to keep this short so we can give some chance for 
people to ask questions.  Maybe I will just throw it 
out to the group:  Where do we go from here?  Are 
there things that we should be doing differently that 
is already being done in this area?  Are there some 
some areas that might be a good prospective area to 
look at merger retrospective studies, or are we 
getting it right and doing them when you can and not 
doing them when you can’t, when you don’t have the 
data to do them? 
MR. VAN VOORHIS:  I have two ideas, one 
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The first I was talking about a little bit 
before, and I throw it out as a challenge to all the 
economists in the room, although I think there is a 
role for lawyers in this.  That is, is there some way 
from the types of transactions I mentioned before — 
the Blockbuster/Hollywood and Sirius/XM and Whole 
Foods, and I’m sure there are multiple others — some 
way from those to generalize some measures of the 
innovation effect in a merger retrospective so that 
it’s not industry-specific?  I don’t have any great 
ideas.  Is it something the parties said and the 
parties argued in those transactions, that X 
innovation was going to happen in Y time, and we can 
compare that across when we’re looking back at those 
and others? 
I also recognize there is likely to be a 
sample size problem here that limits the scope of 
rigorous economics.  Maybe there is a role for lawyers 
where there is some sort of joint effort in doing that 
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potentially a fruitful ground to look back and do some 
retrospective in that way. 
My second one is more general and more 
process-oriented.  As I’ve talked about some of these 
issues and we’ve talked about some of these issues in 
getting the data and how you do this, I’ve tried to 
focus on what might make the business world more 
inclined to participate and to make it easier to get 
as much data and information as possible to do these? 
I wonder if there’s not something like the 
Army Materiel Command (AMC) that could be created with 
a specific goal of doing merger retrospective studies.  
That is, a public-private partnership that in some 
ways is insulated and separate from the enforcers to 
give that comfort that I was talking about that the 
data and information doesn’t go to enforcers 
specifically. 
I recognize there are other problems.  There 
is still the confidentiality problem that would have 
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review, and if you can’t have your results peer 
reviewed by enforcers, at what level do you get to 
that?  And would this entity have subpoena power, and 
lots of other things. 
It’s a very broad idea and you would need 
the political will for Congress to make this happen.  
But I wonder if there isn’t some way to set something 
aside in that way, ring-fence it, so that we could 
really improve upon the quality of our merger 
retrospectives in a big way I think actually with the 
data that’s out there in the world. 
MS. COLEMAN:  Any other responses or 
thoughts? 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  The data issue — the FTC has 
subpoena power under 6(b) to require people to have 
data.  We’ve had mixed experiences with that in line-
of-business data.  Under Tim Muris we used our 
subpoena power.  I think as an enforcement agency we 
have to be self-critical, and we have to do them and 
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I think we’re also very cognizant of the 
burdens and all the other issues involved with using 
our subpoena power.  So we’re not willy-nilly going 
off and doing a retrospective study. 
One of the things that you have to solve — 
you know, any academic could do this.  There are a 
couple problems. 
One of the things that you would want to do, 
if you really wanted to make inferences about the 
overall level of things that we are doing at the 
enforcement agencies, is you’d want to do a lot of 
retrospectives, you’d want to do them at the margin, 
and you’d probably want to do some off the margin. 
Dan Hosken and Orley Ashenfelter did a study 
where they looked at five mergers that they thought 
were marginal and then they did the same number that 
they thought were non-marginal.  They found that HHI 
was actually as an initial screen useful because for 
the ones off the margin they didn’t find price effects 
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that were let go they found the opposite. 
There are those things.  You can have 
outside academics do it just as well as us.  They just 
have to interest them in doing it. 
The one problem is there is something called 
publication bias.  Studying this merger and there are 
no effects — that could be great for my career in my 
tenure file.  That’s a serious problem to correct.  I 
as an academic have been an associate editor on 
journals and I love zero/no-effect papers because I 
think they’re really valuable, as long as they have 
enough power.  But there are a lot of incentive 
problems that you have to correct. 
I think what we are doing at the Bureau of 
Economics is that we are continuing to be committed to 
doing retrospectives whenever we can and giving staff 
time, really critical and scarce staff time, to people 
to do these studies.  We do actually have that 
enforcement knowledge and when we can give people 
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as possible.  
MS. COLEMAN:  I want to leave the last few 
minutes to give a chance for people to ask questions. 
Just a reminder.  If you have a question, we 
ask you to go to one of the mics and identify who you 
are and where you’re from. 
QUESTION [off-mic] [James Keyte]: I won’t 
use a microphone.  I’m James from Fordham. 
Just a quick question on hospital merger 
retrospective studies and this move to willingness-to-
pay.  How do you deal with the situation — and I don’t 
have a horse or a dog in this race — how do you deal 
with the situation where you don’t have competitive 
overlap but under a willingness-to-pay theory maybe 
it’s almost a conglomerate-like merger?  You’re going 
to have a higher willingness to pay — you could call 
it a quality-adjusted price.  It’s just there’s this 
one conglomerate, you’re collecting different 
hospitals, so dealing with managed-care companies you 
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all.  So you might have some but-for kind of issues. 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  We have a term for that.  
It’s called cross-market effects.  Is that what you’re 
talking about? 
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]: Maybe it’s 
for the lawyers. 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  No.  We have a couple of BE 
staffers who are really good, actually Ted Rosenbaum 
and Devesh Raval, I believe.  There are a bunch of 
people who do a lot.  Keith Brand is another one; Dave 
Balan.   
They always look at those effects.  I don’t 
believe we’ve found one that we thought was warranted.  
Patients aren’t going to drive 300 miles, but the 
insurers may have.  Under the willingness-to-pay model 
there might be an effect.  It might be sort of a 
coalition-type threat point type thing.  Those are 
part of the willingness-to-pay models.   
It may be that two hospitals are not close 
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it may be that there is enough overlap that insurers 
are concerned.  So we always look at those.  I think 
that’s a standard thing that both the economists and 
the lawyers look at. 
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]:  All 
right.  So you’re just really looking at the insurers 
as the consumer. 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  That is the WTP model, 
right? 
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]:  Okay. 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  Then our theory is that if 
the insurers raise their price, then consumers in one 
way or another, whether it’s the premium or fee-for-
service.   
That model is all set out in the literature. 
Chris Garmon’s paper in RAND is a neat paper because 
it just really sets out what has become a standard 
model.  It’s not a standard model, it’s a series of 
models, so there’s a WTP, there’s a UPP version.  They 
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QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]:  Yes, 
although that wouldn’t [inaudible]. 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  The big problem is to sort 
out the inframarginal from the marginal consumers.  I 
think Ted Rosenbaum and Devesh are working on that. 
Not to go back to my burning down hospitals, 
but Ted and Devesh have this really neat paper on 
natural disasters.  There were no gas cans and people 
burning down hospitals, but they look at when natural 
disasters close hospitals for extended periods of time 
and they use that as a natural experiment to see what 
goes on with the pricing.  I think it was Katrina or 
one of the big hurricanes that took out a whole bunch 
of hospitals in a geographic market. 
So we are using a lot of the techniques — 
not necessarily to do enforcement, but to learn.  
MS. OVERTON:  And Leemore Dafny at Harvard 
has done a lot of work in that area, too. 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  Right. 
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from Murdoch University.  I just have a question for 
Bruce. 
You talked about the retrospectives on 
consummated mergers and defined that it did result in 
competitive harm as a significant price increase.  Is 
there any potential enforcement action that can be 
done given that this is a consummated merger? 
MR. KOBAYASHI:  Yes, we have the power to do 
consummated mergers.  I think what the Bureau of 
Economics does is we do these studies to evaluate our 
tools and then the Commission can do what they like. 
There are a bunch of mergers that we don’t 
see under Hart-Scott-Rodino.  There is a paper by 
Thomas Wollmann, who’s at the University of Chicago, 
that looks at what happened after they raised the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino thresholds [Stealth Consolidation: 
Evidence from an Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act (2018)].  There is a bunch of mergers that we used 
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But we do non-Hart-Scott-Rodino enforcement.  
We do consummated mergers.  In fact, the Northwestern 
Memorial HealthCare/Centegra Chicago hospital merger 
was a consummated merger.  I think the reason that the 
antitrust enforcement agencies went to premerger 
notification was that it’s hard.  As Lee was saying, 
it’s a bad idea.  I think the term is it was a 
“Pyrrhic victory,” that you end up spending a lot of 
money and it doesn’t — the first panel is remedies, 
right?  There is no remedy, the eggs are scrambled, 
and so you spend a lot of money and you don’t do 
anything. 
But there are things where we could do an 
enforcement action against a consummated merger if we 
learn about it.  We still have conduct cases, and 
those aren’t mergers.  We usually look at everything. 
So it’s possible.  I don’t know if there’s 
any direct case where we did a retrospective and then 
we went out and sued somebody.  I just don’t know. 
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[No response] 
I’d like to thank all the panelists for 
participating and now everyone can head out to lunch. 
[Adjourned 12:15 p.m.] 
